Two footnotes to today's column.

First, two astute readers pointed out that, while it is true that the Electoral College meets in December, the ballots are not counted in the Senate until January. Thus, the "immediately" in the 12th Amendment does not mean a vote "immediately" after the Electoral College electors meet in the respective states (as I thought), but "immediately" after the results are reported in the Senate. Good catch, readers. This means that it would be the 111th Congress, not the 110th, that decides an election, though Cheney would indeed remain as a tie-breaker. As the balance of congressional power changes, so also will both parties' hands in negotiations.

One whose negotiating capacity would not change is Bloomberg's, as he has no partisans in either chamber. I argued in today's column that Bloomberg would not be well-positioned. However, Scott Rasmussen disagrees. He argues that Bloomberg's hand would be very strong. His article is worth a read.

In light of Mr. Rasmussen's disagreement, I'll take this opportunity to expand upon why I think Bloomberg would face a losing battle in the House.
I mentioned that he simply lacks a strong negotiating presence there. That is, there is nobody in the House who is for him, and so there is nobody to represent his interests in negotiations. There are other reasons worth mentioning.

First, if indeed there is a split decision in the first round of House voting, the two parties would have to come to some kind of compromise. This might be where we see the vice presidency (and the Senate) brought into the mix so that nobody is an absolute loser. If Bloomberg is the winner of the presidency in a House compromise, some faction in the Congress becomes an outright loser. After all, the vice presidency can go to only one party. It seems unlikely to me that, in a compromise that will be forged by the House and Senate leadership, one side in the compromise would get nothing.

Second, and perhaps most significant of all, it seems likely that Bloomberg would suffer from the polarization that gerrymandering has created in the House. I mentioned in the earlier column that Bloomberg might be able to appeal to Representatives whose districts he won in the election. However, how many such representatives would there be? Gerrymandering means safe districts, which means districts filled to the gills with reliable partisans. In 2004 John Kerry won 48.3% of the popular vote, but only 41.4% of congressional districts. Why the disparity? It is because, at least in that election, Democratic-leaning districts voted for Kerry more strongly than Republican-leaning districts voted for Bush. And, by my count, there are about 100 or so Republican-held districts in the 111th Congress that gave President Bush at least 60% of the vote in 2004. All in all, most districts in Congress are either strongly Republican or strongly Democratic.

This will hurt Bloomberg because these districts are so tilted in their partisanship that the majority party in them will still probably win the district in a three-way race. To win a heavily Republican district outright, and therefore have a force to exert on that district's member in Congress, Bloomberg will have to win a disproportionately large share of the reliably Republican voters in the district. To win a heavily Democratic district, he will have to win a disproportionately large share of the reliably Democratic voters in the district. How can he appeal to reliable Democrats and reliable Republicans at the same time? He probably cannot, which means he would lose both districts in the House. In actuality, there is probably no way he could ever appeal to the kinds of reliable partisans who would compose the plurality in these districts. They vote with the party in the presidential election.

Bloomberg might be able to win a state in the Electoral College by finishing a strong second in most of its congressional districts, and then finish first in one or two swing congressional districts. However, this would be of little help to him in the House. Failing to win districts outright means that he has no way to induce House members to vote for him, regardless of what happened in the state. So, while he might win a state in the Electoral College, he'll lose it in the House.

Third, can Bloomberg actually induce the House members whose districts he carried to vote for him? We delude ourselves if we think they will do so out of the kindnesses of their hearts. They'll vote for the presidential candidate that maximizes the chances that their political goals will be achieved. One such goal is reelection. Members might vote for Bloomberg if they fear that, by not voting for him, they will lose their next elections.
Bloomberg might make such threats, but can he deliver?

Probably not. In 1828, Andrew Jackson was able to sweep into the White House based upon the "corrupt bargain" of 1824 - in which House members voted against their constituents' selections. However, a Bloomberg candidacy will be a one-off affair. Presumably, unlike Jackson, Bloomberg would not head to Tennessee to plot his return by founding a new political party! So, if a member votes against his or her district by not voting for Bloomberg, who is going to be in that district in the next House election to remind voters of the "fraud?" Not Bloomberg! That kind of activity requires a long term organization, like a political party, which he does not have.

So, while Representatives might believe that a vote against the district will anger constituents, they might also suspect (as I would) that the anger will be temporary and fleeting, as there is no permanent political entity in place to stoke the flame so that it still burns on the next Election Day.

Now, consider the converse. For Bloomberg to win, he will eventually have to induce members to vote for him even though their districts did not vote for him. Who will be in the district in the next congressional election to remind voters of how their will was thwarted? The jilted party!
Representatives who vote for Bloomberg, rather than the party that carried the district, would have good reason to worry about a strong challenge from that party in the next election.

Again, a House battle could play out in a number of ways, so my points are to be taken at an abstract level. Speaking on this level, a vote in the House for Bloomberg would be a high cost, low payoff action; a vote in the House against Bloomberg would be a low cost, high payoff action. This is why I think Bloomberg would be a heavy underdog in the House. Is it possible for Bloomberg to pull off a win? Yes. Is it likely? I do not think so.

Ours is a two-party system. It always has been. This is why Bloomberg, as a third party candidate, would have a difficult-to-impossible time winning the election via the Electoral College. It is also why he would have a hard time winning the election via a House vote. Our system - from the top to the bottom - is a system built for, and built by, two political parties. Bloomberg may have billions of dollars, but I'd wager thousands that he would need trillions to break through hundreds of years of two-party dominance.